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Why does anyone care about the relationship between fiduciary
obligations and contractual ones?
Fiduciary theorists pay more attention the question than do contract
theorists. The latter are more likely to talk about the relationship between
contract law and tort law than about how contract law relates to the law of
fiduciary obligations. This might be because tort law is more familiar and
better understood. Or perhaps there are other reasons. In any case, this
chapter takes it as given that claims that fiduciary obligations are like
contractual ones are more about the purpose and principles of fiduciary law
than about the law of contracts.
Anyone who argues that there is a deep similarity between fiduciary
and contractual obligations faces a hurdle: The two sorts of obligations are
defined in very different ways. An obligation counts as contractual in virtue
of how it comes into existence. Roughly speaking, a person acquires a
contractual obligation by entering into an agreement for consideration. This
simple formation rule applies across a wide range of transactions—anything
from a corporate merger agreement to an agreement between family
members. And it is neutral with respect to the content of the resulting
obligations. Parties can, by and large, contract for whatever first-order
obligations they wish, including fiduciary ones.1
*
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1
Which is not to say that parties can contract for fiduciary remedies.
Because this chapter focuses on possible similarities between contractual
and fiduciary obligations, I largely ignore differences between the remedies
that typically apply to each.
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A duty qualifies as a fiduciary obligation partly in virtue of the
relationship between the obligor and the obligee and partly in virtue of its
content. As Peter Birks observes, the word “fiduciary” is Anglicized Latin,
meaning trustee-like. Fiduciary obligations are obligations that are similar to
those of a trustee.
The truth is that “fiduciary” is one of those words which means
what it does, and what it does is to form a bridge from the express
trust to other analogous situations. . . . A fiduciary relationship is a
relationship analogous to that between express trustee and
beneficiary, and a fiduciary obligation is a trustee-like obligation
exported by analogy.2
The relationships that generate fiduciary obligations share family
resemblance.3 Typically they involve an imbalance of power and degree of
trust. But not every relationship of that sort generates fiduciary obligations.
And an obligation is a fiduciary one only if it has the right sort of content;
notably, only if it requires of the fiduciary some degree of care and loyalty.
The category of fiduciary obligations is defined at least as much by the
obligations’ content as by the relationships to which they attach.
Given the different ways the categories are defined, it is not
surprising that there is overlap between them. Some fiduciary relationships,
such as that between an agent and a principal, originate in contractual
arrangements. And entirely arms-length contracting parties might write
fiduciary-like obligations into their agreement. From a purely analytic
standpoint, the relationship between contractual obligations and fiduciary
ones appears to be like that between organic produce and leafy greens.
Membership in the first category turns on origins, membership in the
second on structural features. Leafy greens can be organic, but need not be.
Organic produce can include leafy greens, but also much else. The only
analytic connection between the two is that both are ways of describing
produce.
But law is not merely a matter of definition. Claims that fiduciary
relationships are types of contracts or that fiduciary obligations are
contractual in nature are not meant to state analytic truths. Nor are they
claims that the law of fiduciary obligations should be subsumed into the
law of contract. No one is arguing that because fiduciary obligations are
contractual they should be subject to the consideration requirement, the
Mailbox Rule, or Hadley v. Baxendale. What is being claimed is that there
is some deep similarity or continuity between fiduciary obligations and
2

Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISRAEL L. REV. 3,8
(2000).
3
See John Glover, The Identification of Fiduciaries, in PRIVACY AND LOYALTY
269 (Peter Birks ed., 1997).
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contractual ones. “Fiduciary obligations are contractual,” is best read as a
metaphor. It is designed to prompt the listener to look for similarities or
connections that she might not otherwise see.
This chapter examines three ways to unpack the metaphor. The first
concerns the content of fiduciary obligations. The most plausible claim here
is not that the content of fiduciary obligations is like that of contractual
ones, but that the tools lawmakers apply to determine the content of
fiduciary obligations should be the same ones they use to determine the
content of contractual ones. The second possible claim concerns causative
events. Fiduciary obligations and contractual obligations are both acquired
obligations. They presuppose what Birks calls a “causative event.” In
contract law, the causative event is typically an agreement for
consideration. In fiduciary law, the causative event is entering into the right
sort of relationship. The claim here is that there is a deep similarity between
those causative events, one that illuminates the nature of fiduciary
obligations. Third, much of contract law is made up of defaults, which
parties have the ability to alter. Some fiduciary obligations are also defaults.
Perhaps the mutability of fiduciary obligations reflects a deep similarity
between the grounds of fiduciary and contractual obligations.
This chapter discusses each possible claim. My goal is not to
provide a definitive resolution to any of them. By disaggregating them for
separate consideration, I hope to cast some new light on each. The thrust of
my argument, however, will be that any similarity between fiduciary
obligations and contractual ones does not tell us much new about the
former. The reason is that the grounds of contract law are more complex
than is sometimes assumed. I conclude by identifying some reasons for
caution when wielding the “fiduciary obligations are contractual”
metaphor.
1

Content

Is there anything that the content of contractual obligations tells us
about the content of fiduciary ones? The best known claim that there is can
be found in the work of Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel. Easterbrook
and Fischel stake out a radical position: “Fiduciary duties are not special
duties; they have no moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations,
derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings.”4
This Part distinguishes several claims Easterbrook and Fischel make under
this heading and discusses the grounds for each. I then describe and defend
a minimalist contractualism about the content of fiduciary duties—one so
minimal that it arguably does not deserve to be called “contractualist.”

4

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36
J. LAW & ECON. 425, 427 (1993).
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Analytic considerations already discussed suggest reasons to doubt
that the content of contractual obligations can tell us anything about the
content of fiduciary ones. A legal obligation is contractual not by virtue of
its content, but by virtue of being generated in the right way. Contractual
obligations are created by acts that satisfy the conditions of contractual
validity, such as entering into an exchange agreement. They are, as
philosophers say, content independent: the reason for recognizing the
obligation does not turn what the obligation requires.5 Given that contract
law says so little about the content of contractual obligations, why should
we expect it to tell us anything about the content of fiduciary ones?
Of course contract law is not entirely silent on the first-order
obligations parties can contract for. Three generally applicable mandatory
rules limit the performance obligations parties can put in their contracts.
Courts will not enforce commitments that are against public policy, such as
a promise to perform an illegal act; courts will not enforce terms that are
unconscionable; and courts impose on all contracts a mandatory duty of
good faith.6 But judicial interpretation and application of these rules suggest
that they tell us little about fiduciary obligations. The public policy rule is a
narrow one, emphasizing mostly third-party effects. Fiduciary obligations,
on the contrary, look to be structured primarily for the benefit of the
obligee. The unconscionability doctrine prohibits only the most extreme
forms of advantage taking. It is a far cry from a fiduciary’s positive duties of
loyalty and care. Moreover, substantive unconscionability usually must be
paired with some procedural defect to render a term unenforceable. Finally,
as Daniel Markovits observes, the duty of good faith “permits contracting
parties to remain as self-interested within the contract relation as they were
without it,” requiring only that they “limit their pursuit of their private
interests according to the terms of their contractual settlement.”7 Contract
law demands from parties no more than the minima moralia of the
marketplace, obligations that fall far short of the duties of loyalty and care
that characterize fiduciary obligations.
If there is a connection between the contents of contractual and
fiduciary obligations, it lies not in their substance but in the method of
determining what those obligations are. This is one of Easterbrook and
Fischel’s claims. They call for “filling gaps in fiduciary relations the same
way courts fill gaps in other contracts. The subject matter may differ, but
5

See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers (pt. 2),
in 46 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 79, 95-96 (Supp. 1972).
6
The content of some contract types is governed by additional mandatory
rules. Examples include usury laws, minimum wage laws and consumer
protection laws.
7
Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The Noncontractual Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 209, 213 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, eds. 2014).
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the objective and the process is identical.”8 Call this the “methodological
continuity thesis.” No matter what the substantive differences between
contractual and fiduciary obligations, lawmakers should use the same
methods and procedures to determine their content.
Stated at this level of generality, the methodological continuity
thesis is fairly weak. It is satisfied, for example, by the proposition that the
content of both sorts of obligations should be that which a wise judge
would decide—a claim that tells us almost nothing about what the content
of either should be.
Easterbrook and Fischel fill in the methodological continuity thesis
with a more substantive theory of how lawmakers should determine the
content of both types of obligations: hypothetical agreement. When a court
must fill a gap in a contract, they argue, it should seek out terms the parties
would have chosen if they had had the time and resources to reach
agreement on the matter. If, for example, the question in a contract case is
whether a tenant had a duty to inform a lessor of an obscure term in a 20year old lease when the tenant was laying the groundwork to invoke that
term, the court might ask whether, if the parties had thought about the
matter when negotiating the contract, they would have agreed to such a
duty.9 When a court seeks to determine the legal duties of a fiduciary, it
should ask the same question: Given the practical problem that the
fiduciary relationship was aiming to solve—according to Easterbrook and
Fischel, some form of agency problem—what duties would rational parties
have agreed to assign to the fiduciary if they were given all the time and
resources needed to think the problem through? I’ll call this the
“hypothetical agreement method.”
There are two senses in which the hypothetical agreement method
might be called “contractual.” The first is the sense I’ve been discussing.
According to Easterbrook and Fischel, it is the method that courts should
use to determine the content of contractual obligations as well as fiduciary
ones. The term “contractual” seems especially appropriate in this respect,
for the method feels especially natural when it comes to filling contractual
gaps, where the parties have agreed on some terms but not others.
The hypothetical agreement method might also be called
“contractual” because a hypothetical agreement is like a hypothetical
contract. In fact, the more common term in the literature is “hypothetical
contract.” But here care is required. Hypothetical agreements cannot do all
the justificatory work that actual agreements or contracts do. Thinking
about what parties would have agreed to is a way to identify what terms
can be expected to maximize their welfare. Self-interested, knowledgeable
and rational parties will agree to terms that they expect to maximize their
8

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4 at 429.
The example comes from Judge Posner’s opinion in Market Street
Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991).
9
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respective gains from a transaction. The justificatory force of hypothetical
consent lies not in the idea of consent, but in the welfare effects that it
identifies. As Anthony Kronman observes:
[O]nce we have concluded, for whatever reasons, that a rule is
welfare-enhancing, the assertion that the parties to a hypothetical
contract would voluntarily choose it adds nothing but rhetorical
force to our conclusion; it is, so to speak, pure window-dressing.
Hypothetical contract arguments are thus not really contractualist at
all. They explain and justify their conclusion by an appeal to
considerations of welfare alone.10
Easterbrook and Fischel’s hypothetical agreement method is not so much a
commitment to thinking of fiduciary obligations as contracts as it is a
commitment to welfare economics.
Once we understand this, we can distinguish the hypothetical
agreement method from a separate contractualist claim Easterbrook and
Fischel make: that parties should have the power to modify their fiduciary
obligations, or that “[a]ctual contracts always prevail over implied ones.”11
The hypothetical agreement method does not ask what terms the actual
parties to a transaction actually would have agreed to had they actually
thought about the matter. It asks what terms perfectly rational and perfectly
knowledgeable parties would have agreed to if granted all the time they
needed to reach an accord. These imagined actors are given perfect
knowledge, perfect rationality and unlimited time in order to identify
welfare-maximizing terms. It is not obvious that actual parties will arrive at
the same result. On its own, the hypothetical agreement method does not
entail that parties should have the ability to choose or alter their fiduciary
obligations.
One can get from hypothetical agreement to “[a]ctual contracts
always prevail over implied ones,” with either of two additional premises.
The first is that parties are better positioned, by virtue of knowledge and
interests, to decide for themselves which terms best suit their needs than are
courts, legislatures or regulators, which likely know less about the
transaction at issue and do not have a stake in it. Alternatively or in
addition, one might argue that party choice is a separate and perhaps
sufficient ground for enforcement. The first is a common premise of promarket neoclassical economic analysis. The second is the defining claim of
autonomy theories. Easterbrook and Fischel invoke both when they write

10

Anthony T. Kronman, A Comment on Dean Clark, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1748, 1750 (1989).
11
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4 at 427.
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that “[t]o say that express contracting is allowed is to say that the law is
designed to promote the parties’ own perception of their joint welfare.”12
I will say more about the value of party choice in fiduciary law in
Parts Two and Three. For the moment, I simply observe that Easterbrook
and Fischel need one of these two premises, or a third, to get from the
hypothetical agreement method to their preference for party choice. But
neither premise is uncontroversial. It might be that in some, if not all,
fiduciary relationships we can expect lawmakers using the hypothetical
agreement method to arrive at terms that create more value than those that
the parties would choose. That might be so because parties are imperfectly
rational, because parties have imperfect knowledge of the risks of the
transaction, because parties have insufficient time and resources to weigh
pertinent costs and benefits, or because one party is more sophisticated
than the other or enjoys other bargaining advantages likely to produce an
inefficient outcome. Alternatively or in addition, it might be that the social
interest in imposing one or another fiduciary obligation outweighs the value
we attach to party choice. Sometimes the law imposes duties on persons
that they don’t want. We might worry about attaching too much weight to
party choice especially where there is an imbalance of power or the
opportunity for exploitation—common characteristics of fiduciary
relationships. In short, one might accept Easterbrook and Fischel’s narrower
methodological claim about the value of hypothetical agreement without
committing oneself to their more thoroughgoing contractualism about
fiduciary obligations.
This is important because the hypothetical agreement method has
real benefits. To ask what obligations fully informed and rational parties
would have agreed to is to ask what obligations best serve the parties’
interests. No matter what policies or purpose fiduciary obligations serve,
they are clearly designed to protect beneficiaries’ interests. And as
Easterbrook and Fischel emphasize, changing one term in a transaction can
have unintended adverse effects on other terms. Just as adding a warranty
might result in an increase in the price of goods, increasing or decreasing
the scope of a fiduciary’s obligations might to affect other aspects of her
transaction with the beneficiary.
A beneficiary who does not value the new service or higher degree
of loyalty at more than the cost of providing it is worse off, the
opposite of a court’s objective; if the beneficiary does value the
extra service at more than its cost, then the parties would have
provided for this service by contract in a transaction-cost-free
world.13

12
13

Id. at 429.
Id. at 431.
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Because the hypothetical fully informed, perfectly rational negotiating
parties take a holistic view of costs and benefits—trading off a cost here for
a benefit there—the hypothetical agreement method should capture such
negative welfare effects. Hypothetical agreement is a tool for thinking
through the full range of effects a fiduciary obligation might have.
That is not to say that hypothetical agreement is or should be the
sole method for determining the content, default or mandatory, of fiduciary
obligations. First, it is not obvious that welfare economics captures all of the
law’s reasons for recognizing and enforcing fiduciary obligations. Second,
the hypothetical agreement method provides less certainty than lawmakers
might want. The most all-things-considered efficient mix of obligations
often depends on empirical facts about which we know very little. These
include parties’ risk preferences, how much they know about the law and
how much it affects their behavior, and the power of reputational and other
nonlegal incentives. The absence of information about the values of these
and other variables makes it easy to tell just-so stories as to why a
lawmaker’s or theorist’s preferred rule is the value-maximizing one.
Nonetheless, the hypothetical agreement method is helpful for
identifying unintended costs that a proposed change in fiduciary obligations
might bring. If one holds that fiduciary obligations are designed to protect
or promote the welfare of beneficiaries, it is difficult to see why all of their
welfare effects—intended and unintended—should not be considered when
determining their content. The hypothetical agreement method does not
commit a theorist to welfare economics or efficiency as the only goal when
designing fiduciary obligations. But it provides an important check when
doing so.
2

Causative events

A second way in which fiduciary obligations might be like
contractual ones is in their causative events—how one acquires the
obligation. Because a contractual obligation comes from the obligor’s
voluntary agreement to it, the law of contracts is often treated as the
paradigm of a private power-conferring law, and contracts as a form of
private legislation. To the extent that fiduciary obligations are voluntarily
acquired, one might think they too are chosen obligations, and that
fiduciary law is, like the law of contracts, grounded in principles of
autonomy or choice. A more complete account of contract law, however,
suggests a more complicated picture.
There is no doubt but that contract law gives private persons the
ability to purposively undertake legal obligations when they wish.14
14

I discuss the themes in the following five paragraphs in greater detail in
Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power and Compound
Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726 (2008).

What If Fiduciary Obligations Are Like Contractual Ones?

9

Sophisticated parties are able to determine with precision when contractual
obligations will attach, what the content of those obligations will be, how
their agreement will be interpreted, who will enforce it, and the
consequences of breach. And they can achieve those legal results by the
simple mechanism of agreeing to them, which is to say, by expressing their
shared intent to achieve those results. In such transactions, contract law
operates as a private power-conferring law. It gives parties the ability to
undertake new legal obligations when they wish.
That said, not all of contract law fits the model of private legislation.
Contemporary contract law does not require that parties either intend or
express an intention to undertake legal obligations.15 “Neither real nor
apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the
formation of a contract.”16 Parties acquire contractual obligations simply by
entering into exchange agreements, which are not distinctively legal acts. It
is therefore possible for persons to acquire contractual obligations
unwittingly. Corbin suggests the following example:
There seems to be no serious doubt that a mutual agreement to
trade a horse for a cow would be an enforceable contract, even
though it is made by two ignorant persons who never heard of a
legal relation and who do not know that society offers any kind of a
remedy for the enforcement of such an agreement.17
The point is not that unexpected contractual obligations are common. It
might be that the vast majority of contracting parties understand themselves
to be entering into a legally binding agreement. But if so, that is an
empirical fact, not a legal requirement. Contemporary contract law is
designed to attach legal obligations not, or not only, because parties want
them, but because they have entered into the right sort of relationship.
This feature of contract law suggests that it is designed to do more
than confer on parties the power to undertake obligations when they wish.
Contract law is also designed to impose legal duties on parties for reasons
that have nothing to do with their intent vel non to acquire them. Contract
theorists have suggested various reasons for such a duty-imposing function.
15

There are exceptions. Among the complexities is the nominal rule in civil
law countries and in Great Britain that “[i]n order to be bound by a contract
a party must have an intention to be legally bound.” THE COMMISSION OF
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art.
2:101 cmt. B (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000). For a more detailed
discussion, see Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437
(2009).
16
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981).
17
1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 34, at 135 (1st ed.
1950).
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These include the social interests in protecting a promisee’s reliance, in
supporting the practices of promise-making and promise-keeping, and in
enforcing obligations of corrective justice that arise after a breach. Other
evidence for contract law’s duty-imposing function includes courts’
openness to finding implied-in-fact contracts, the fact that a bare
representation can generate an express warranty and default interpretive
rules that are highly contextualist.
The causative events that generate contractual obligations are
therefore various. Often the events can be characterized as acts of private
lawmaking, in which parties intentionally undertake new legal obligations
to one another. But the conditions of contractual validity do not require the
expression of such an intent. In other transactions, the causative event is
simply agreement to an exchange transaction.
This variety says something about the broader purposes of contract
law. It suggests that with respect to the single duty to perform, contract law
serves both a power-conferring and a duty-imposing function. I have called
this the “compound theory” of contract.18 The compound theory maintains
that contemporary contract law recognizes and enforces the single duty to
perform for two very different reasons at once. It does so in order to give
parties the power to purposively undertake new legal obligations to one
another when they wish. And it does so in order impose legal obligations
on parties for reasons that do not involve party choice.
What about the causative events associated with fiduciary
obligations? James Edelman has emphasized that that most fiduciary
relationships are based on the fiduciary’s consent or agreement.19 Edelman
quotes with approval the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Norberg v
Wynrib:
Although fiduciary relationships may properly be recognized in the
absence of consent by the beneficiary—the consent of a child to his
or her parents acting in a fiduciary capacity for the child’s benefit is
not required—they are more typically the product of the voluntary
agreement of the parties that the beneficiary will cede to the
fiduciary some power, and are always dependent on the fiduciary's
undertaking to act in the beneficiary's interests.20
Fiduciary obligations are voluntary in the sense that one does not become a
trustee, an executor, a guardian, a corporate director, a joint venturer, an
agent, an attorney, a teacher or a priest by accident. One consents or agrees
to the position. The resulting fiduciary obligations are therefore voluntary
18

Klass, supra note 14.
James Edelman, When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?, 126 L.Q. REV. 302
(2010).
20
Id. at 313 (quoting Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226 at 273).
19

What If Fiduciary Obligations Are Like Contractual Ones?

11

obligations, in the sense that they are products of the fiduciary’s voluntary
acts. Does this suggest that fiduciary obligations are contractual in nature?
Edelman is probably wrong to claim that all fiduciary relationships
originate in the fiduciary’s consent or agreement. Courts have held, for
example, that parents owe a fiduciary obligation to their children.21
Although Edelman works hard to construe the role of parent as premised on
a voluntary undertaking,22 it is not obvious that this is the best reading of
how a person acquires those obligations. More generally, because fiduciary
obligations are identified as such by structural features of fiduciary
relationships and by their content, there is no a priori reason why they
might not sometimes attach to non-voluntary relationships.
That said, many fiduciary relationships are voluntary. Voluntary
fiduciary relationships can be divided into two broad categories.
Some voluntary fiduciary relationships come into existence without
the law’s help. The relationships between teacher and student and between
priest and parishioner, for example, are not in the first instance legal ones.
They exist in and are defined by the social world in which we find
ourselves, regardless of whether the law takes notice of them. The same can
be said of some more discrete relationships that generate fiduciary
obligations. A person who assumes management and control over trust
property might become a trustee son du tort, whether she knows it or not.23
Though these relationships are voluntary in the sense that the fiduciary
voluntarily enters into them, there is no requirement or reason to expect
that the fiduciary knows she is entering into a transaction that will alter her
legal obligations in that way.
When the law attaches fiduciary obligations to such nonlegal
voluntary relationships, it looks to be serving a duty-imposing function,
rather than a power-conferring one. Because the relationship can come into
being without the law’s help, we cannot be sure that the fiduciary knows,
much less intends, the legal obligations that attach to it. The law of
fiduciary obligations in these instances is designed to impose legal duties
on fiduciaries not because they want or have undertaken those duties, but
for other reasons.
And of course it is easy to imagine what those reasons might be.
Fiduciary relationships are generally characterized by asymmetries of
power, trust and vulnerability. Fiduciaries typically enjoy discretionary
powers or privileges, whose exercise can significantly affect the nonfiduciary’s well being. These powers and privileges often create the risk of
opportunism, leaving the non-fiduciary especially vulnerable to the
fiduciary’s breach of trust. In such circumstances, the case for legal
21

See, e.g., M(K) v M(H) [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 (Australia). See also Elizabeth S.
Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents As Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995).
22
Edelman, supra note 19 at 311-12.
23
See, e.g., King v. Johnston, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1488 (Ct. App. 2009)
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intervention to protect the non-fiduciary against neglect and opportunism is
an easy one, and does not depend upon the fiduciary’s intention to
undertake the obligation.
If the fiduciary obligations that attach to such nonlegal voluntary
relationships are similar to contractual obligations, they are similar to
contract law’s duty imposing aspect—the fact that one can acquire
contractual obligations unaware. The causative event in both cases is the
choice to enter into a nonlegal relationship of the right sort. The resulting
obligations might be said to be voluntary in the sense that it could have
been avoided. Yet the obligations have not been voluntarily undertaken in a
more robust sense. There is no reason to expect that the obligor objectively
intends, wants or even expects the legal obligation. The law’s reason for
imposing the obligation cannot therefore be the obligor’s intention to
undertake it.
This similarity does not tell us much new about fiduciary
obligations. Contract law’s duty-imposing function is not distinctive, except
in its pairing with contract law’s power-conferring aspect. The dutyimposing side of contract law suggests comparisons to tort law or family
law—other fields in which legal obligations are imposed in order to protect
vulnerable persons, to deter harmful behavior, to compensate for wrongful
losses, and so forth. A claim that fiduciary obligations are like the dutyimposing aspect of contract law does no theoretical work.
Other fiduciary obligations attach to legally constituted
relationships—relationships that they cannot exist without the law’s help.
Examples of legally constituted fiduciary relationships include those
between executor and legatees, between guardian and ward, between
corporate director and shareholders and between a licensed financial
advisor and her clients. There are no executors outside the law of wills and
probate, no guardians outside the law of guardianship, no corporate
directors outside of the law of corporations, no licensed financial advisors
outside of the regulatory framework they operate in. The relationships
themselves are creatures of law. They are legally constituted. When a
person knowingly becomes a fiduciary in such a relationship, she therefore
understands herself to be assuming a new legal role24 that involves new
legal powers and obligations—though she may not understand what all
those powers and obligations are. Unlike parents, priests, teachers or
24

Rather than “new legal role,” one might say “new legal status.” I’ve
chosen “role” because “status” is sometimes associated with legal situations
that are not chosen, such as being a firstborn child. My use of “role”
encompasses both Hanoch Dagan and Elizabeth Scott’s “office” and their
“contract type.” Hanoch Dagan & Elizabeth S. Scott, Reinterpreting the
Status-Contract Divide: The Case of Fiduciaries, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND
FIDUCIARY LAW ___, [MS at 9-10] (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, eds.,
2016).
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borrowers, agreeing to enter into such a legal relationship is perforce
agreeing to the legal role and everything that comes with it. If the fiduciary
obligations that attach to extralegal voluntary relationships can be
analogized to the duty-imposing side of contract law, perhaps the fiduciary
obligations that attach to legally constituted voluntary relationships are
more similar to the power-conferring aspect of contract law.
There is no question but that the laws that establish the roles of
executor, guardian, corporate director and licensed financial advisor are
private power-conferring rules of a certain type. They confer on private
persons, who satisfy certain conditions, the power to enter into a new legal
role. A person becomes an executor, a guardian, a corporate director or a
licensed financial advisor by choice. In some instances the law requires that
the choice be expressed in a formal legal act. To become an executor in the
District of Columbia, a person named as such in a decedent’s last will and
testament must file a petition with the applicable court seeking an order
naming her the executor for the estate.25 To become the guardian of an
adult, one must file a petition requesting assignment as such.26 In other
instances, no formal act is required, though the fiduciary must express her
agreement to the new legal position or status. Thus to become a corporate
director, one need express only an intent to undertake the position, usually
in the form of an employment contract. In all these cases, however, the law
grants the potential fiduciary the power to choose whether or not to accede
to the new legal role, and it grants her the role based on the exercise of that
choice.
I think the best available argument that the power to become a
fiduciary of this sort is like the power-conferring aspect of contract law goes
as follows: The legal role of fiduciary is just a bundle of Hohfeldian jural
relations.27 To be a fiduciary of one type or another is to have a certain
collection of legal duties, powers, privileges, immunities and so forth. The
new powers are often especially salient. But what makes the relationship a
fiduciary one is that those powers come with certain obligations attached to
their exercise. To say that someone is an executor is to say both that she has
the legal powers to maintain and dispose of the estate’s assets, and that she
has the fiduciary obligations of care and loyalty in the exercise of those
powers. To say that a person is a corporate director is to say both that she
has the legal power to make certain executive decisions on behalf of the
corporation, and that she has certain fiduciary obligations towards the
shareholders. This way of understanding the role of a fiduciary suggests a
deep similarity between legally constituted fiduciary relationships and
many contracts. To purposively enter into a contract is also to knowingly
25
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effect a change to one’s jural relations. Although the new obligation to
perform is the most salient change, contracts often also come with new
powers, privileges, immunities and so forth. Both fiduciary law and contract
law therefore give persons the power to purposively effect changes in their
legal relations with others. Both enable private persons to alter their
powers, privileges, immunities and obligations. At least some fiduciary
obligations are therefore best understood as the result of private legislative
acts, comparable to contract law’s power-conferring aspect.
The above argument relies on picturing the role of fiduciary as a
bundle of jural relations. The bundle theory of property illustrates the power
of that analytic approach. Decomposing an apparently simple and natural
legal concept into its constituent parts can reveal otherwise hidden
complexity and contingency, and suggest alternatives that might otherwise
remain out of view.28 But like other reductive projects, this mode of analysis
can also have a leveling effect. It risks leaving important variables out of the
equation.29 Reducing fiduciary statuses to mere bundles of jural relations
tells us something important about them. But it does not tell us everything.
In order to see why, consider a different analogy: to become a
fiduciary in a legally constituted relationship is like acceding to a public
office. Take the ability of the candidate who has received the most votes to
become a member of Congress. Like other legal roles, to be a member of
Congress is, from a one perspective, just to enjoy a special collection of
legal powers, privileges, immunities, duties and so forth. The most salient of
these is the power to participate in the legislative process. But the office
also comes with legal privileges and duties. The Speech and Debate Clause
of the US Constitution, for example, gives members of Congress immunity
from civil arrest while attending or travelling to and from a session of
Congress.30 The federal bribery statute makes it a crime for members of
Congress and other public officials to receive anything of value in return for
influence on their official acts.31 The power to become a member of
Congress is the power to acquire a collection of new powers, duties,
privileges and immunities.
Like the fiduciary obligations of an executor, guardian, trustee or
corporate director, a Congressperson’s duty to obey the bribery statute is in
a sense voluntary. When taking the oath of office, she knows she is
acceding to a new legal role. She might not be aware of every new power,
28

See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS
(PROPERTY) 69 (1980).
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For a similar point about bundle theories of property, see Thomas Merrill
and Henry Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111
YALE L.J. 357 (2001).
30
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6(1); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 614
(1972).
31
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privilege, immunity or duty that comes with her new office. She might not
know, for example, of her constitutional immunity from civil arrest under
the Speech and Debate Clause. And she might not know that if she accepts
a bribe, she will now be subject to criminal prosecution under the bribery
statute. But her choice to assume the office, together with her generic
awareness that it involves a new legal role, is enough to say that the new
duties are voluntary ones. If she is later indicted under the bribery statute
and complains that she is being held to too high a standard, one might
reply, “You knew, or should have known, or could have known, what you
were getting into when you chose to take the oath of office.”
The example is relevant because there is an important difference
between the power to become a member of Congress and the power to
enter into a contract. The duties that the bribery statute imposes on
members of Congress are voluntary in the sense that they are the knowable
consequences of the decision to become a member of Congress. They are
not, however, what we expect to motivate individuals to run for Congress.
We do not expect people to seek to become members of Congress for the
sake of the new legal duties they will thereby acquire.
Contractual obligations are different. Because contracts originate in
exchange agreements, a person’s reasons for entering into a contract are
more closely tied to her resulting obligations. In a contractual exchange,
one side undertakes an obligation as the price of the other side’s return
promise or performance. In the language of the Second Restatement, “[i]n
the typical bargain, the consideration and the promise bear a reciprocal
relation of motive or inducement: the consideration induces the making of
the promise and the promise induces the furnishing of the consideration.”32
A party who is engaged in exchanges of this sort does not merely expect the
resulting duty to perform. She seeks it for instrumental reasons. Undertaking
the duty to perform is essential to achieving her plans and projects, namely,
receiving some promise or performance in return. Her new obligation
allows her to accomplish what she could not otherwise. Contractual
obligations are not merely expected, but specifically intended.
Both a member of Congress’s legal duty not to accept a bribe and a
contracting party’s legal duty to perform result from the exercise of a legal
power. The causative events are, in this respect, similar. But in other
respects, the events are very different. We expect parties to enter into
contracts for the sake of the new obligations they thereby acquire. We
expect people to become members of Congress for the sake of the powers
they thereby acquire, and not for the sake of the new duties. These different
expectations correspond to a difference in the law’s reasons for imposing
the duty. When contract law functions as a power-conferring rule, the
reason for recognizing the duty lies in the social interest in giving persons
the ability to undertake new legal obligations when they wish. That reason
32
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presupposes that parties often enter into contracts seeking the resulting legal
obligations. Because we do not expect people to enter public office for the
sake of the new duties they thereby acquire, this cannot be the reason for
imposing those duties. All this is a long way of explaining what was
obvious from the start. The purpose of the federal bribery statute is not to
give individuals the power, by becoming members of Congress, to acquire
the duty not to accept bribes. It is to impose on members of Congress the
duty not to accept bribes, whether they want that duty or not.
The question, then, is whether entering into a legally constituted
voluntary fiduciary relationship is, with respect to the obligations that come
with it, more like purposively entering into a contract or more like entering
into a public office. There is considerable variety amongst fiduciary
relationships, and there are probably at least as many reasons for becoming
a fiduciary as there are types of fiduciaries. One person’s reasons for serving
as the legal guardian of her mentally incompetent sibling are likely to be
very different from another’s reasons for serving on a corporate board, both
of which might be different from a person’s decision to serve as a licensed
financial advisor. I believe that with respect to many legally constituted
fiduciary relationships, however, there is a strong intuition that those
entering into them do not typically do so for the sake of the legal
obligations they thereby incur. Much more salient to, say, the position of an
executor or that of a guardian are the legal powers the fiduciary acquires.
The fundamental fiduciary obligations of loyalty and care ride atop those
powers. The fiduciary’s duty of loyalty is a duty to exercise those powers in
the interests of the beneficiary; her duty of care is a duty to use a reasonable
level of knowledge and expertise in exercising them. Fiduciary obligations
are, in this sense dependent on fiduciary powers.33 This conceptual
ordering—which a bundle theory of fiduciary obligations does not
capture—is often reflected in the reasons individuals choose to become
fiduciaries. Although the fiduciary might know that by acquiring the new
role she acquires those obligations, we do not expect that her to undertake
the role for the sake of the obligations.
This is not to say that fiduciary obligations are never salient.
Especially when the fiduciary and beneficiary are engaged in an exchange
of services for money, as are a financial advisor and her client, the scope of
the fiduciary’s duties of loyalty and care might be a key part of the deal.
Here the fiduciary is being paid in part for performing her fiduciary
obligations. Where this is so, the fiduciary’s voluntary undertaking looks
more like a contractual undertaking.
33
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This suggests that the category of legally constituted voluntary
fiduciary obligations is mixed. Entering into some relationships within the
category is, with respect to the obligations one thereby acquires, more like
becoming a member of Congress. Entering into others is, in that respect,
more like entering into a contract.
The above analysis can be summarized using David Owens’s
fourfold classification of moral obligations based on whether and how the
obligation is dependent on the obligor’s exercise of a prior choice.34
Obligations of the null grade in Owens’s schema are choice
independent. Owens suggests as an example the moral duty to help a child
in distress. The obligation to assist simply exists, no matter what prior
choices the obligor has made. Some fiduciary obligations—any that attach
to being a parent—are of this null grade. Their causative events need not
include a choice by the fiduciary. The reasons for imposing those
obligations cannot depend upon choice.
A person incurs a first grade choice-dependent obligation as the
result of her prior choice, but without regard to whether she knew she was
incurring the obligation. By driving a car, for example, I incur a legal and
moral obligation not to drive drunk, whether I know I am incurring it or not.
Fiduciary obligations that attach to extralegal voluntary relationships, such
as those between a priest and parishioner, teacher and student, borrower
and lender, are first grade choice-dependent. The existence of the
obligation depends upon an exercise of choice, but not upon the chooser’s
knowledge of the legal obligations that she thereby incurs. Although the
fiduciary obligation is choice-dependent, the law’s reasons for imposing it
do not appear related to that choice. Fiduciary obligations of this sort are
comparable to contract law’s duty-imposing function.
Obligations are second grade choice-dependent “where someone’s
choice puts them under [the] obligation only when they make this choice in
the knowledge that it might have the effect of putting them under this
obligation.”35 Owens suggests friendship as an example.
Someone becomes my friend by spending time with me, by sharing
various activities and experiences, by expressing interest and
affection. And there are duties of friendship, things one is obligated
to do for one’s friends but not for other people. Still, one ignorant of
the prevailing forms of friendship (perhaps newly arrived in this
country and simply “being friendly”) could not be held to these
expectations.36
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The third grade of choice-dependence appears when a person not only
must know that her choice will result in a new obligation, but must intend
or appear to intend the obligation if she is to incur it. Obligations of this
grade result from the exercises of normative powers. Promissory obligations
are the example par excellence. A successful promisor undertakes a new
obligation by virtue of her expression of an intent to do so.
My analysis of the fiduciary obligations that attach to legally
constituted voluntary relationships can be restated as an argument that such
obligations can be either second or third grade choice-dependent. Many
such obligations are second degree choice-dependent. The fiduciary’s
knowledge that she will incur new legal obligations by assuming a new
legal role might figure into the reasons for imposing them on her. They
might, for example, remove an objection to imposing them.37 But the law
does not require that she intend to incur the obligations. Fiduciary
obligations are third-degree choice dependent only when we expect
fiduciaries to not merely expect, but also to intend, those duties, and when
that intention is a reason for their legal recognition. Only fiduciary
obligations of this type are comparable to the power-conferring aspect of
contract law.
This Part has focused on the different ways a fiduciary’s choice
figure into her acquisition of fiduciary obligations. The question is
interesting because it tells us something about the sorts of reasons why the
law might recognize those obligations. The relatively limited role of choice
in the generation of many fiduciary obligations suggests that the law has
other reasons for recognizing them.
3

Mutability

A third way fiduciary obligations might be like contractual ones lies
in their mutability—the fact that some fiduciary obligations are defaults,
which the parties can agree to alter. Although there are connections
between an obligation’s voluntariness and its mutability, the two are
distinct design features. Whether an obligation is voluntary, in the sense I
am using the term, turns on the types of acts that generate the obligation.
Whether it is mutable turns on whether parties have the ability to alter the
obligation that would otherwise attach to their acts.
This chapter does not address the positive question, whether or to
what extent private parties can modify, or even extinguish, the fiduciary
37
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obligations that attach in virtue of their relationship. It is today clear that
some fiduciary obligations are defaults. John Langbein has documented, for
example, the default status of many obligations of gratuitous private
trustees, which “yield to the more particularized intentions that parties may
choose to express or imply in their trust deal.”38 Langbein’s study, however,
concerns only one type of fiduciary relationship.39 More ambitious claims
about the general mutability of fiduciary obligations need to be backed by
similarly detailed studies of the law governing other members of the genus.
Nor does Langbein fully explore the extent of parties’ ability to modify a
gratuitous private trustee’s fiduciary obligations. Parties might have the
power to alter some aspects of those obligations, yet there might remain an
“irreducible core” of mandatory obligations they cannot avoid.40 The extent
to which the contemporary law of fiduciary obligations includes an
irreducible core is another important question I do not address.
I am also not going to consider the normative question: whether any
given fiduciary obligations should be mandatory or alterable. Easterbrook
and Fischel advance an argument for mutability based on the principles of
welfare economics and an empirical claim about who can better assess
which terms maximize party welfare. But pure welfare economics is hardly
uncontroversial, especially outside of the context of corporate law, which is
where Easterbrook and Fischel focus their analysis. And Easterbrook and
Fischel’s argument about the relative capacities of parties and lawmakers is
an empirical claim, which might or might not be true and which might
receive different answers in different contexts or for different sorts of
fiduciary relationships. More generally, it is not obvious that the mutability
question should get the same answer across the full range of fiduciary
relationships. The reasons to empower the parties to alter the fiduciary
obligations of a corporate director or financial advisor might not apply to
the fiduciary obligations of a guardian, trustee de son tort or teacher.
Whether a fiduciary’s obligations should be mandatory, mutable, or some
mix of the two is a design question to be answered on the basis of policy,
purpose and practical effects. Given the variety among fiduciary
relationships, it would be odd if the answer were always the same.
This Part instead addresses two related questions. The first is an
interpretive-theoretical one: What does it mean that some fiduciary
38
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obligations are mutable? What can we infer about the law’s reasons for
recognizing a fiduciary obligation from the fact the obligation is only a
default? The second, related question concerns legal design: What are the
considerations that should go into setting default fiduciary obligations and
determining what parties must do to contract around them?
The ability to purposively modify or opt-out of fiduciary obligations
is itself a legal power. If parties to a trust arrangement have the ability to
structure it so as to exempt the trustee from the no-conflict rule, that is
because the law of trusts gives them the power to do so. More precisely, it
is because the rule permitting the exemption gives parties the ability to
modify or extinguish the obligation by expressing their intention to do just
that. Where fiduciary obligations are mutable, the law governing them
confers on private parties the power to change those obligations. Default
fiduciary obligations, together with the rules that say what parties must do
to alter those obligations, are power-conferring laws.41
It does not follow that the law imposing the fiduciary obligation in
the first place is power conferring, or that it is designed solely to promote
party choice. Consider the tort of negligence. By agreeing to an exculpatory
clause, private parties can contract out of liability for negligently harming
one another.42 To agree to such a clause is to exercise a legal power. But it
does not follow from the existence of that power that the primary purpose
of the law of negligence is to promote party choice. In Owens’s
classification, the tort duty of care is at most grade one choice-dependent.
Although it might result from a person’s prior choice, say to operate a ski
resort, the duty of care does not depend upon her knowledge that she was
41
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thereby acquiring the obligation, much less upon the expression of an
intent to do so. The ability to contract out of negligence liability does not
entail that negligence law is designed to confer the power to undertake a
duty of care.
The point of the example is not that all fiduciary obligations are
comparable to the law of negligence. I have argued that fiduciary
obligations might be grade one, two or three choice-dependent. The point
is simply that the power to alter an obligation does not entail that the
obligation itself is the result of a power-conferring rule. Private parties’
ability to modify a legal duty does not tell us everything we might want to
know about the reasons for assigning it to them in the first place.
The same point applies to contracts. Without denying contract law’s
power-conferring aspect, a clear understanding of how contract defaults
work illustrates ways that contract law, even when it gives parties the ability
to choose, is often structured to recognize values other than party choice. A
more complete understanding of this aspect of contract law illuminates
what sorts of conclusions theorists can draw from the mutability of fiduciary
obligations.
First, some basic concepts. Any mutable term, whether it belongs to
contract law, fiduciary law or some other area of law, is the product of two
rules: a default rule and an altering rule. The default rule specifies the legal
state of affairs absent the right legal actor’s expression to the contrary. The
associated altering rule specifies whose expression of what meaning in
what form is sufficient, or necessary and sufficient, to change the default
legal state of affairs. To take a simple example, section 2-314(1) of the
Uniform Commercial Code establishes the implied warranty of
merchantability: “Unless excluded or modified . . ., a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.” This legal state of
affairs is a default, for it applies only “[u]nless excluded or modified.”
Section 2-316 contains associated altering rules, as it specifies several ways
to exclude or modify the implied warranty. Section 2-316(3)(a), for
example, provides that a seller’s use of conventional phrases such as “as is”
or “with all faults” suffices to exclude all implied warranties. And section 2316(2) stipulates that when a seller does not use such phrases, “to exclude
or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the
language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous.”
Contract defaults and altering rules are often designed to be choice
promoting. So-called majoritarian defaults seek to capture the terms a
majority, or at least plurality, of parties would choose. Majoritarian defaults
promote party choice in several ways. First, they make it cheaper for parties
to obtain the terms they want, as it costs less to remain silent than to speak.
Second, when evidence is lacking, majoritarian defaults make it more likely
that the court will impose the term that the parties actually wanted or
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expected. Third, majoritarian defaults are often easier for parties to
anticipate, Family Feud style. Non-majoritarian, information-forcing
defaults, which are sometimes termed “penalty defaults,” can also be
designed to promote party choice. When one party is more sophisticated
than the other, setting the default against the sophisticated party’s interests
can give her a new reason to educate the other about relevant legal
consequences—by expressly addressing them in order to contract around
the default. Alternatively or in addition, sharing that information can make
it more likely that a court or third-party adjudicator will enforce the
agreement that the parties intended. Information-forcing defaults can
promote choice both by informing parties what they are choosing and by
improving the accuracy of enforcement.
Contracts scholars have paid more attention to default rules than to
the associated altering rules.43 I have written a bit about altering rules, and
Ian Ayres has recently devoted an article to their design.44 Ayres identifies
two variables in the design of altering rules relevant to promoting party
choice: transaction costs and error costs.45 Transaction costs are the costs to
the parties of specifying a non-default term. Error costs occur when parties
fail to understand the legal effects of their words and actions, or when
courts fail to assign those words and actions their intended effect. Designing
contract altering rules to maximize the parties’ ability to get the terms they
want requires minimizing, to the extent possible, both sorts of costs.
Sometimes this involves a tradeoff between the two. For example, formal
requirements like the use of a writing or the inclusion of standard
disclosures can reduce the chances of judicial or party error. But such
requirements increase the costs of contracting around the default. Magic
words like section 2-316’s rule for “as is” or “with all faults” can reduce
transaction costs. But when nonsophisticates do not know the code, they
can cause party error. Maximizing parties’ ability to get the terms they want
involves striking the right balance between these costs.
In short, there is no doubt but that contract default and altering rules
can be designed to maximize the parties’ ability to choose. Rules that
43
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exhibit the above design elements—majoritarian or information-forcing
defaults, altering rules designed to minimize both transaction and error
costs—can be evidence that the law is designed to promote party choice, or
that it functions as a power-conferring rule.
But default and altering rules can be designed to achieve other ends
as well. They can do so in two ways: by changing the parties’ incentives to
pick one term or another and by using the law’s expressive power.
A default establishes the legal state of affairs absent a relevant legal
actor’s contrary expression. Because parties have finite time, attention and
resources, they sometimes fail to opt-out of defaults even when, other
things being equal, they would prefer a non-default legal state of affairs. As
a result, defaults are generally sticky. A default’s stickiness is largely a
function of the altering rule associated with it—what it takes to opt-out of
the default. As Ayres explains, “[t]he stickiness of a default derives from the
relative difficulty of contracting around—particularly if the altering rules
impede fully-informed contractors from contracting for certain non-default
effects because of the costs of complying with the impeding altering
rules.”46 Consequently, the stickiness of a default is partly within
lawmakers’ control. Just as altering rules can be designed to promote
choice by reducing the transaction costs of achieving a non-default term,
they can alternatively be designed to impede party choice by increasing
those costs. Writing requirements, prolix mandatory disclosures, magic
words and the like can all increase the cost of opting out of a default. Such
altering rules impede departures from the default. Impeding altering rules
can be used to impose something like a Pigouvian tax on attempts to
achieve a non-default legal state of affairs.
Another way of putting this is that the choice between mandatory
and default rules is not a binary one. There is a spectrum that runs from
choice-promoting defaults and associated altering rules, which make it very
easy to avoid a default, through to defaults with altering rules that make it
more costly to avoid a default, and then on, at the far end of the spectrum,
to mandatory rules that make it impossible to avoid a default.
This is important because sticky contract defaults can be used to
advance social interests other than party choice. By setting the contract
default at the socially preferred term, lawmakers can cause more contracts
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to include that term, while still giving sufficiently motivated parties the
ability to opt out of it. As I have written elsewhere:
Stickier defaults, and by implication costlier opt-outs, . . . can
mediate between the sometimes conflicting interests the law has in,
on the one hand, granting parties the power to control the scope of
their legal obligations and, on the other hand, imposing liability on
parties because of extralegal wrongs they have committed, harms
they have caused, or other considerations.47
Ayres, an economist, identifies only two reasons why lawmakers might
want to make a default stick: “to protect people inside (paternalism) or
outside (externalities) the contract.”48 A broader view of the non-choicebased reasons for imposing contractual obligations might include society’s
interests in enforcing the moral obligation to perform, in doing justice
between the parties after breach, or in supporting the moral culture of
making and keeping agreements. Impeding altering rules are tools that
lawmakers can use to achieve those ends, while still giving sophisticated
and sufficiently motivated parties the power to get the nondefault terms
they want.
A second way that a default can serve values other than party
choice lies in law’s expressive capacity. Because we live in a culture that
expects laws to reflect collective values, contracting parties often read the
default to signal a collective judgment about what sorts of terms or
behaviors are moral, just, right, efficient or otherwise socially preferred.
This can be another cause of stickiness. Contract defaults stick not only
when it is expensive to contract around them, but also when parties treat
the legal default as a signal and use it to guide their choices and even to
form their preferences. But the point here goes beyond incentives and
stickiness. The default implied warranty of merchantability, for example,
does more than give merchants a new reason to sell goods of passable
quality. It says what we as a society believe the appropriate morals of the
marketplace to be. The rule caveat emptor no longer expresses what we
expect of sellers. The expressive dimension of defaults provides yet another
avenue for advancing values beyond party choice.
In short, mutability does not entail that the default should either
reflect the terms that the majority of parties want or be designed to elicit
information to improve the quality of that choice. A default and the
associated altering rule might be designed to serve goals that do not depend
upon party choice, either because the default is likely to stick or because it
expresses other social values.
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What does this mean for the theory of fiduciary obligations? I
argued in Part Two that legally constituted fiduciary relationships are
power-conferring laws in that they give parties the ability to choose
whether to take on the role of a fiduciary. Default fiduciary obligations are
power conferring in a different way: they give sophisticated and sufficiently
motivated parties the ability to change their fiduciary obligations when they
want. Insofar as fiduciary law builds in legal powers of this sort, it is similar
to the power-conferring aspects of contract law.
But like the power to take on the role of the fiduciary, the fact that
the parties have the power to alter their fiduciary obligations does not tell
us everything we might want to know about the law’s reasons for
recognizing and enforcing those obligations in the first place, or even its
reasons for permitting parties to modify them. To answer those questions,
we need to know more about the scope of the parties’ power to alter their
fiduciary obligations, about the law’s reasons for picking a default
obligation, and about what it takes for parties to contract around that
default. It will be important to ask, for example, how sticky a default
fiduciary obligation is, and whether it is sticky by accident or by design.
One would also want to ask whether the default expresses a collective
decision about the appropriate duties of a fiduciary, whether it is
majoritarian, or whether it is simply a coordinating rule. Again, there is no
reason to expect the same answer for every sort of fiduciary relationship, or
for every fiduciary obligation. Neither the voluntary aspect of fiduciary
obligations nor their mutability can be understood from 30,000 feet.
Understanding the meaning of either requires closer examination.
4

A concluding caution

There are several ways, then, in which fiduciary obligations are like
contractual ones. Both are designed primarily to benefit parties to the
relationship, making it important to ensure that their design takes into
account both intended and unintended welfare effects. Asking which
obligations fully informed rational parties would pick is, for both sorts of
obligations, a way to check that. Both types of obligations are, by and large,
voluntary obligations, in the sense that they come about only as the result
of parties’ voluntary acts—in the case of fiduciary obligations, entering into
the right sort of relationship, in the case of contractual obligations, entering
into an exchange agreement. Finally both sorts of obligations are sometimes
mutable, giving private parties the power to alter the duties that attach to
their relationship.
The question is whether these similarities tell us anything interesting
about the law of fiduciary obligations. Contract law is often held up as the
paradigm of a private power-conferring law. In fact, contract law serves a
compound power-conferring and duty-imposing function. A more nuanced
understanding of the design and functions of the law of contracts suggests
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that the structural similarities between fiduciary obligations and contractual
ones tell us less about fiduciary law than we might hope. (The differences
between fiduciary obligations and contractual ones might be more
revealing.)
I would like to conclude by suggesting that not only are the
similarities between fiduciary and contractual obligations uninformative,
but too much emphasis on them risks importing into fiduciary law
problematic aspects of the law of contracts. I am thinking here of the almost
talismanic quality that, at least in the United States, appeals to consent play
in the judicial interpretation and enforcement of contracts. Important and
valuable though party choice is, the language of consent is too often used
to obscure what is really going on between contracting parties. This can be
seen especially in the governance of mass consumer contracts, which might
put us on guard against attempts to understand fiduciary obligations on the
model of contract law’s power-conferring aspect.
As almost any cell phone owner or software user knows, consumers
do not read or understand the contracts they agree to. Systematically
collected empirical evidence backs this up.49 Yet courts often take the
consumer’s bare act of consent—signing a credit-card application, clicking
an “I Agree” radio button—as sufficient reason to enforce just about any
term that the associated document contains. As many commentators have
observed, such a rule effectively gives sophisticated drafters a carte blanche
to include terms that are most favorable to the drafter. These include terms
such as class action waivers and arbitration clauses that operate in practice
to preclude recovery for breach and other wrongs.50
The results can be problematic for at least two reasons. First,
emphasis on the formal act of consumer consent can distract from actual
disparities between the parties’ sophistication and power, and from the
fairness and efficiency of the resulting terms. Our culture rightly valorizes
freedom to contract and freedom of contract. It does not follow, however,
that a consumer’s bare act of consent to terms she has predictably neither
read nor understood should license their enforcement, regardless of the
terms’ fairness or effect on consumer welfare. Yet much existing doctrine in
the United States appears to do just that. When the only check on drafters is
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a consumer’s bare act of assent, we should worry that consumers will
suffer. Second, the widespread adoption in consumer contracts of drafters’
preferred terms can result in the widespread deletion of rights that there is a
social interest in maintaining. The contractual shifting of employment
discrimination and other civil rights claims to private arbitration, for
example, threatens to erode the development and effectiveness of those
laws. The legal effect granted the bare act of consent also threatens broader
social harms.
This too brief survey illustrates the potential costs of a certain type
of contractualist thinking. A final lesson from contract law is to be on guard
against placing too much weight on acts of consent when seeking to justify
the content and enforcement of fiduciary obligations. Appeals to individual
choice and consent are powerful forces in U.S. legal culture, at times riding
roughshod over other legal, moral and policy arguments or principles. To
characterize fiduciary obligations writ large as chosen obligations is to
locate them within that rhetorical space. Doing so can lend credibility to
private attempts to contract out of fiduciary obligations when our attitude
should be more skeptical. And it can obscure other social interests that the
law of fiduciary obligations serves.

